Telecommunications and digital technology are more than just keeping people connected. They form the foundation for education, commerce, agriculture, national security, healthcare, and national development as a whole. This is why the policies by which the sector is governed should be very clear and unambiguous. But as of now, we cannot say that for Ghana.
The country’s telecoms policy seems to be at a crossroads, marked by significant shifts such as the wholesale 5G policy through a special purpose vehicle, the awarding of tech neutrality and extra 4G spectrum to the only SMP (Significant Market Power) in the sector, debates over ISP access to 5G, and, recently, the proposed absorption or merger of AT Ghana (formerly AirtelTigo) by or with Telecel. It is not even clear exactly what it is.
These significant policy issues are being discussed with passion, but also with confusion. It is a no-brainer that until and unless the policies around these issues are made clear, and handled with stringent financial measures and stakeholder engagement, the sector risks repeating the very past mistakes that resulted in the one-directional telecoms market structure in the country today.
The Current State of Play
Recent reports confirm several key developments:
The Ministry of Communications, Digital Technology and Innovations has proposed a restructuring involving AT Ghana and Telecel. Although the Minister, Sam George, was earlier reported on the Ministry’s own LinkedIn page to have told workers of AT Ghana that the two companies were being “merged,” he later clarified that, legally, it is not a merger or acquisition, but rather a regulatory intervention due to AT’s severe debt situation.
Per the Minister’s earlier submission, the government was presented with a debt of GHS1.5 billion by tower company ATC Ghana with respect to its services to AT Ghana during the era of the previous government. In addition, the Minister said AT Ghana has been carrying large losses of up to $10 million in the first eight months of the year.
Both AT and Telecel are described by some members of the Parliamentary Oversight Committee as financially constrained and unable to inject fresh capital. It is estimated that AT Ghana’s debt is around $200 million, while that of Telecel is also about $200 million or more. In fact, the Minister himself had openly accused Telecel of failing to inject the US$100 million capital they promised before the 70% majority shares in Ghana Telecom were signed off to them.
While that matter is still hanging around the neck of Telecel, Group CEO Moh Damush has recently given another promise that the company is ready to invest some US$50 million to expand the network to accommodate the additional 3 million-plus subscribers from AT Ghana. Whether the current government will take that second promise at face value or demand proof of funds as a condition precedent remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, the government has granted the special purpose vehicle NGIC (NextGen Infrastructure Company) an exclusive wholesale licence for 5G and instituted a shared/neutral host model for 4 G. Under this model, other operators should be able to connect to NGIC rather than build standalone 5G infrastructure. The Minister was clear in stating that the choice to build a shared 5G network was a “deliberate policy decision” meant for the good of all stakeholders — including MNOs, ISPs, government, and, most importantly, consumers.
AT Ghana and Telecel have indicated readiness to subscribe to the shared 5G model, in keeping with government policy. But MTN Ghana, currently the dominant player with a market share of over 75% in data, has resisted or delayed connecting to NGIC, raising questions about policy implementation. In fact, MTN Ghana’s CEO has openly stated that there is no business case for 5G in Ghana, simply because, according to him, there are only one million 5G-ready devices on MTN. This comment flies in the face of the government’s policy decision to pursue a shared network model. But the Minister and the industry regulator are dead silent on it. In fact, the Minister rather repeated MTN’s chorus in a TV interview shortly after his appointment.
To deepen the confusion even further, recently, the MTN Group CEO, Ralph Mupita, told journalists in Ghana that the company is in talks with the government and the regulator, which will hopefully result in the launch of 5G on MTN Ghana soon. Again, this contradicts the 10-year exclusivity clause in NGIC’s licensing terms regarding 5G. It is unclear whether the Group CEO’s comment meant that MTN will soon connect to NGIC, or whether the government is considering altering NGIC’s licence terms to make way for MTN to be granted a standalone 5G licence.
In the face of the dominant player dragging its feet on the shared 5G network model, ISPs would have been a critical channel (in addition to the two smaller MNOs) through which 5G could be made accessible to the public faster. But ISPs face a phased access restriction; the regulatory directive (policy decision) states that for the first six months of NGIC operations, ISPs may only connect to NGIC’s wholesale infrastructure through an “anchor” MNO — not directly. After this period, ISPs are expected to have full rights to connect independently.
Clearly, there is serious policy confusion in all this. It becomes even more confusing as the government attempts to merge two weak players into a supposed competitive player. This is not new — Airtel and Tigo merged into AirtelTigo, which is today called AT Ghana. In fact, the merged entity, AT Ghana, now 100% owned by the government of Ghana, has become weaker and weaker over the years.
The Weakness of Merging Two Weak Entities
The sector Minister initially announced that the government was in talks with Canadian investor Rektron Group, reported to have offered US$150 million for a 60% stake in AT Ghana. But later, the Minister announced that steps were far advanced to “merge” AT and Telecel to create a stronger second player to compete with MTN. He mentioned three specific levels of the merger and stated that the process was far advanced. The Minister has since clarified that it is an absorption, not a merger.
However, there are inherent weaknesses in merging two underperforming telcos without first resolving their foundational problems:
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Debt burden will persist and perhaps magnify: Both AT and Telecel carry large debts. As stated above, AT owes over GH¢1.5 billion to one tower company, plus other legacy debts to other creditors and vendors, and has also accumulated an additional $10 million debt in the last eight months alone. Telecel also has an estimated debt of well over US$200 million. Without a clean-up or capital injection, the merged entity may be larger but still fragile. Experts estimate that the merged entity would need at least $500 million to both settle its debts and invest. The Minister even places the figure at US$600 million.
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Operational inefficiencies are not magically eliminated by size: Two weak networks, poor billing systems, and low customer satisfaction will remain unless management and processes are overhauled. According to the Minister, AT Ghana’s infrastructure has reached “end of life.” Currently, about 3.2 million AT Ghana customers are already roaming on Telecel as part of the consolidation process. Telecel has announced that by the close of 2026, all of AT Ghana’s subscribers will have been absorbed. However, technical experts in the industry maintain that Telecel’s own network is as old as AT Ghana’s and therefore not particularly capable of taking on the AT Ghana load. Indeed, AT customers roaming on Telecel continue to complain about poor service quality.
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Investment capacity remains constrained: Neither AT nor Telecel has demonstrated the ability to bring sufficient new investment. A merged entity still needs capital for 4G/5G upgrades and rural coverage expansion. Telecel has hinted at some US$50 million investment in the pipeline — just half of what experts estimate is required to make any meaningful impact. Merging AT and Telecel means the Rektron $150 million deal for AT Ghana is off the table. Meanwhile, the Minister has previously accused Telecel of failing to bring in a $100 million upfront investment earlier. So, there is a big issue regarding capital investment, and there are no guarantees so far.
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The market power of MTN will likely remain overwhelming: Even combined, AT + Telecel’s market share remains far below MTN’s. At the last count, MTN controlled at least 73% of the total market, leaving a combined AT and Telecel with only 27% — significantly low, given that the Minister himself has said that any player with less than 30% market share cannot survive. Besides, MTN’s infrastructure, brand, and subscriber base give it a persistent competitive advantage. MTN has proven to be a tough competitor in the development of the industry over the years. That trend will not change unless the government masters the courage to implement SMP interventions robustly. This writer is reliably informed that MTN has no interest in becoming a monopoly, so it is up to the government to implement the right policy measures to prevent that.
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Risk of creating another fragile “second best”: The merged entity risks being a larger but still weak operator, doing little to drive genuine competition and innovation.
Member of Parliament for Mpraeso, Davis Ansah Opoku, has warned that “merging two struggling companies without new investment will only lead to more losses,” asking, “What happens to the huge debt that has not been dealt with?”
The Problem of ISP Access, Wholesale Model, and MTN SMP Risk
As stated earlier, under the current regulatory guidance, ISPs may only connect to NGIC’s wholesale infrastructure through an “anchor” MNO for the first six months. This phased approach ensures stability but delays ISP independence and competitive entry.
MTN Ghana, as the dominant operator and currently designated a Significant Market Power (SMP) entity, wields substantial influence over the market. SMP status legally obliges MTN to avoid anti-competitive practices, such as delaying interconnection or limiting access to wholesale infrastructure. MTN’s hesitation to fully connect to NGIC raises the risk of SMP-related regulatory breaches, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the wholesale model. Delays or restrictive practices could give MTN continued control over pricing, service innovation, and market entry for smaller providers.
Once the six-month anchor-MNO phase ends, ISPs are expected to connect directly to NGIC’s infrastructure, restoring competitive balance. But the interim period shows how MTN’s SMP position could reinforce market dominance and slow competition, impacting consumers and smaller operators alike. In fact, as MTN drags its feet on joining the shared network model, it has accelerated expansion of its fibre-to-the-home (FTH) offering to capture the broadband market with its improved 4G network ahead of 5G rollout.
This is why the restriction on ISPs’ initial access, combined with MTN’s SMP leverage, risks reducing price competition, slowing innovation, and limiting consumer choice — contrary to the objectives of Ghana’s broadband policy.
Proposed Fixes: What We Can Do to Get It Right
Per conversations with industry experts, avoiding pitfalls means Ghana needs reforms that balance stability, fairness, and competitiveness:
1. Debt Audit and Restructuring before Mergers or Restructuring
There is a need to transparently quantify all debts owed by AT and Telecel — especially to tower companies, creditors, and regulatory agencies. A restructuring plan must be created, including write-downs, renegotiation, or phased repayment backed by fresh capital. Only after debts are managed should any merger or restructuring proceed.
2. Requirement for Fresh Capital and Operational Turnaround
AT and Telecel must commit to a credible capital injection plan and management overhaul. The regulator must enforce performance milestones: network coverage, subscriber growth, and customer satisfaction. This is non-negotiable.
3. Clarity and Speed in Policy Implementation
The regulator must ensure NGIC issues clear timelines for all operators, including MTN, to connect once robustness, reliability, and coverage meet market standards. One argument against NGIC is that, to date, there is no network ready for connection. Indeed, the two MNOs with connecting entity licences are not technically ready to connect, and the only player that is technically ready — MTN — has refused to apply for a connecting entity licence.
However, it remains important for the regulator to formally monitor and enforce these timelines, ensuring that no operator delays access to wholesale infrastructure beyond the approved period. It would also be useful for ISPs to gain timely “connecting entity” status to ensure a level playing field after the six-month anchor-MNO phase.
4. Regulatory Independence and Enforcement
The NCA must actively enforce rules around infrastructure sharing, licensing, and SMP obligations. How the NCA has remained indifferent and silent on MTN’s posturing regarding infrastructure sharing for 5G is surprising.
5. Merger or Restructuring Conditions
Any AT–Telecel restructuring must be conditional. There must be proof of fresh capital, clean balance sheets, improved customer metrics, expanded rural coverage, and transparent governance.
6. Stakeholder Engagement and Transparency
Regular public consultations involving ISPs, consumer groups, tower companies, operators, the Ministry, and the NCA are critical to addressing policy confusion. In the spirit of transparency, there is a need to publish progress reports — particularly regarding debt resolution, NGIC implementation, ISP access, and merger milestones.
7. Safeguards for Consumer Welfare
Ensure pricing remains affordable, service quality is high, and rural areas are included. This means the regulator must monitor outcomes and enforce compliance.
How These Fixes Benefit All Stakeholders
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Consumers: Faster, affordable broadband and mobile services, especially in underserved areas.
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Operators: AT–Telecel can become a credible challenger; MTN faces real competition.
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Towercos: Overdue accounts resolved, securing network stability.
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ISPs: Phased access ensures they can compete independently post-anchor-MNO phase.
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Government: Strengthened credibility, reduced fiscal risk, and better digital inclusion outcomes.
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Investors: Transparency and restructuring improve confidence and sector attractiveness.
If Ghana gets it right, the result will be a stronger, fairer, and more resilient telecoms sector — capable of competing meaningfully with MTN and delivering for all citizens. If not, we risk cementing inequality: fast, affordable connectivity for some, and continued exclusion and high costs for many.
For policymakers, regulators, and industry leaders, the time for clarity is now.
The author, Samuel Dowuona, is a multiple award-winning telecoms and technology journalist with many years of experience producing articles that influence industry policies at both the regulatory and operator levels. He can be reached at dowuonasamuel24@gmail.com
